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T
he various Defense IT trade journals are of-
fering increasingly nuanced discussions of 
how open source software (OSS), service 
oriented architecture (SOA), Agile software 
development, and the “cloud” concept can 
and should be applied to streamline, accelerate, and 
improve the defense enterprise (DE) IT acquisition 
process. It is refreshing to see these subtly nuanced 
and pragmatic views in lieu of the “religious” black-
and-white arguments that had here-to-fore been 
typical in the defense-related IT literature. However, 
generally absent are discussions of widespread suc-
cess at these various modern IT paradigms within 
the DE. Why is that?
Our sense is that the DE has indeed little widespread suc-
cess at deploying modern IT paradigms such as SOA, OSS, 
“cloud,” or “Agile.” In our view, the elephant in the room is 
that to leverage any of these at scale, the DE must be gener-
ally competent to ield large IT systems. Clearly, that is not the 
case. If the myriad GAO and Defense Science Board (DSB) 
reports over the last decade were not suiciently convincing, 
surely the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
Section 804 is. 
Section 804 is a succinct mandate requiring OSD to explain 
to Congress how it aims to inally ix its IT acquisition process. 
In response to Section 804, OSD has submitted its November 
2010 report (A New Approach for Delivering IT Capability to the 
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T
he various Defense IT trade journals 
are ofering increasingly nuanced dis-
cussions of how open source software 
(OSS), service oriented architecture 
(SOA), Agile software development, 
and the “cloud” concept can and should be ap-
plied to streamli e, accelerate, and improve the 
defense enterprise (DE) IT acquisition process. 
It is refreshing to see these subtly nuanced and 
pragmatic views in lieu of the “religious” black-
and-white arguments that had here-to-fore 
been typical in the defense-related IT literature. 
However, generally absent are discussions of 
widespread success at these various modern IT 
paradigms within the DE. Why is that?
Our sense is that the E has indeed little widespre d suc
cess at deploying modern IT paradigms such as SOA, OSS, 
“cloud,” or “Agile.” In our view, the elephant in the room is 
that to leverage any of these at scale, the DE must be gener-
ally competent to ield large IT systems. Clearly, that is not th
case. If the myriad GAO and Defense Science Board (DSB) 
reports over the last decade were not suiciently convincing, 
surely the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
Section 804 is. 
Section 804 is a succinct mandate requiring OSD to explain 
to Congress how it aims to inally ix its IT acquisition process. 
In response to Section 804, OSD has submitted its November
2010 report (A New Approach for Delivering IT Capability to the 
DoD) and established an IT Acquisition Reform Task Force (IT-
TF). The IT-TF reports to Deputy Secretary of Defense William 
Lynn and is l d by Deputy Chief Ma agement O cer Elizabeth
McGrath. 
We b lieve that Lynn’s and McGrath’s success at responding 
to the congressional mandate will depend on their ability to
address Einstein’s dilemma. Recall that Einstei  thought try-
ing to solve a problem with the same approach that created 
the problem was crazy. It seems to us that Defense leaders 
should take a cue from Einstein and ask themselves why the 
dozens of previous reports, roadmaps, and mandates aimed 
at ixing aspects of Defense IT acquisition have not led to the 
envisioned successes. Perhaps it is because the tacit assump-
tion made by these reports is that the as-is/to-be gap can and 
will be bridged by the existing Pentagon processes. So far, that 
assumption has proven false. Einstein might have said that it 
is time for new assumptions. 
One efective technique—arguably the most efective tech-
nique—for mitigating risk in any new initiative is to assign the 
best person to the project, free him or her from other respon-
sibilities, allow him or her to pick an elite team, and empower 
the team with suicient resources and top cover to succeed. 
This is the approach good leaders invariably apply when the 
stakes are high. 
‘Sgt. Rock! Pick your best five soldiers and TAKE THAT HILL! 
We’ll cover you.’ 
The typical approach to executing a new initiative within the 
DE bureaucracy is to assign it as additional duty to an already 
overtasked senior executive. That senior executive inevitably 
establishes a working group(s). The working group is com-
posed either of “stuckees” involuntarily assigned for various 
reasons (rarely associated with expertise), or volunteers who 
choose to join the project because they have a vested interest. 
The working group meets on a regular schedule. It eventually 
delivers a report of some sort. Any subsequent success “on the 
ground” requires that someone actually read the report and 
do something about it. In our experience with this approach, 
success is rare. 
Einstein might have suggested that OSD should try the former 
approach this time around—i.e., ind the metaphorical Sgt. 
Rock, tell him/her to take the hill, and cover this person while 
she/he heroically does that. 
Phenomena such as eBay, Amazon, Google, Travelocity, IRS 
eFile, Wikipedia, Facebook, the iPhone, Linux, and others have 
clearly inluenced the thinking of Defense leadership. That is, 
Defense leaders have recognized how IT-related paradigms 
like SOA, Agile, cloud, and OSS have contributed to the mas-
sive success of these enterprises. Defense concepts like “net-
centric operations/warfare” and, lately, “cyber operations/
cyber warfare” aim to harvest similar success at scale through 
application of the same IT paradigms. Indeed, the Defense 
netcentric implementing policies and ensuing initiatives seem 
to be based on the notion that particular technologies can, in 
and of themselves, bring about desired outcomes. The hypoth-
esis seems to be “If the DE provides generic technologically-
enabled network resources, then military programs will reap 
untold beneits.”
However, in our research, we ind very few people who argue 
that programs like Netcentric Enterprise Services (NCES), 
Defense Travel Service (DTS), Navy Marine Corps Intranet 
(NMCI), Defense Knowledge Online (DKO), the various “gov-
ernment open source” software repositories—not to mention 
the various C4ISR programs embracing SOA—have had the 
degree of success-at-scale of their commercial exemplars. 
The various Defense netcentric policies and initiatives inevita-
bly fail to recognize the fundamental fact that, in all the impres-
sive exemplars, it is value proposition (VP) and the supporting 
business model that drives success at scale. In other words, 
technologies serve as catalysts if and only if they enhance the 
VP, business model, or both. For example, the travel business 
was lourishing long before Travelocity entered the picture. 
Travelocity decreased time and cost associated with existing 
lucrative transactions by applying web services and service 
architecture. Likewise, Amazon, eBay, and IRS eFile, within 
their chosen domains. Collaborative portals such as Java.net 
and SourceForge allow compelling OSS projects to scale glob-
ally. Non-compelling OSS projects wither and die on the same 
collaborative portals that support the massively successful 
projects, as do non-compelling Wiki sites. 
In other words, technologists can fuel success when they 
follow the money. By carefully observing existing patterns 
of transactions, providing tools that reduce barriers to those 
transactions, and expanding the market space, IT practitioners 
can fan sparks into bonires by providing “enterprise” capa-
bilities. However, they need to start where the sparks already 
exist. 
Defense leaders should 
take a cue from Einstein 
and ask themselves why 
the dozens of previous 
reports, roadmaps, and 
mandates aimed at fixing 
aspects of  Defense IT 
acquisition have not led to 
the envisioned successes. 
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Therefore, Einstein might have suggested that the DE stop 
pushing particular technologies, and focus on “market forces.” 
That is, for the DE to succeed with OSS, SOA, cloud, Agile, etc, 
the DE must seek out existing “commerce” among members 
of the defense community that might beneit from better IT 
tools. Studying the existing functional transaction space will 
enable discovery of VPs and enabling business models—that 
is, “acquisition strategies”—that resonate within a particular 
ecosystem of competent and empowered providers and con-
sumers of the required IT capabilities. 
Study of success cases reveals that an effective business 
model/acquisition strategy inevitably recognizes two basic 
truths: you get what you measure, and you get what you pay 
for. Measuring the right things and then contracting for the 
right things are both critical to success. Today the DE mea-
sures compliance with bureaucratic requirements and size of 
empire. DE executes its program and budget accordingly. DE 
programs outsource engineering of very large complex sys-
tems, via long serial processes. Hence, DE programs tend to 
deliver capability that is archaic, late, and over budget. 
Needed Changes for Needed Outcomes
What fundamental changes to that “outsource-your-brains-
and-measure-compliance” model will catalyze the desired 
fundamental changes in program output? 
At least one DE community of practice is embracing this Ein-
steinian approach to IT Acquisition Reform. Members of the 
USN and USMC Intelligence Community, under the Aegis of 
the Section 804 mandate, are establishing what they call a 
Naval-Intelligence Capability Evolution (N-ICE) Pilot Portfolio. 
The HQ Marine Corps director of intelligence, and the USN 
Program Executive Oice for Command, Control, Commu-
nications, Computers and Intelligence (PEO C4I) Principal 
Deputy for Intelligence, are the leaders of this community. 
Their near-term objective is to deliver critical persistent intel-
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (PISR) to blue forces 
on the tactical edge in Afghanistan. 
Generally, the N-ICE value proposition is better speed to better 
capability. The industrial jargon for this universally accepted 
approach is time to value. For a ixed IT budget, the objective 
is to optimize Value of Acquisition (VoA), where:
VoA = (value per capability) x (number of capabilities) ÷ (cal-
endar time to develop/test/certify) ÷ (cost). 
Value is the critical parameter. Given that for N-ICE, the ap-
plication domain is intelligence, value is most likely to be as-
sociated with the quality of collection, processing, and delivery 
of information. Time and cost either enhance or detract from 
basic value. If either time or cost grows to the point where 
VoA drops below some threshold value, it is time to walk away 
from sunk costs, and/or de-scope the efort, in order to get 
something useful in the warighters’ hands in time to make a 
diference.
Generally the N-ICE business model is value-of-the-shelf 
(VOTS). Of-the-Shelf (OTS) means a capability is readily 
consumable—that it is pre-certiied for DE use, is available 
via convenient procurement vehicle, works out of the box, and 
comes with life cycle support. The N-ICE approach is to: (1) 
buy down as much risk as possible with pure OTS capability 
and deploy that capability immediately; (2) identify speciic 
gaps between existing OTS capability and the total require-
ment; (3) close the OTS gap by investing within the COTS 
ecosystem to develop new OTS capabilities. 
In this model, it is critically important that the government 
retain full intellectual property rights to the IT the government 
pays to develop. One good way to do that is to require devel-
opers to use open source licenses for government-developed 
components. In any case, this approach requires an objec-
tively speciied “modular open systems approach” (“MOSA,” 
which is un-deined jargon in many DE IT policy documents). 
The industrial best practice re MOSA is called “product line 
architecture” (PLA). PLA provides detailed technical speciica-
tions for persistent modular IT “platforms.” The IT platform 
plug-and-play speciications, then, allows eicient re-use of 
components and enables lucrative time-to-value for multiple 
IT-enabled enterprises. 
Apple iPhone, iPad, and iPod, and MacBooks all share the 
same PLA, for example. Google and Microsoft likewise specify 
their own versions of PLA. In industrial PLA “open” is obviously 
a relative term. Consider, for example, iPhone’s proprietary 
development environment vs. Android’s open source environ-
ment. Both are “open” to their own large diverse ecosystems of 
developers. However, in every case of efective PLA, “open” is 
described objectively and in great technical detail. That is not 
the case in most defense system architectures. 
The VP of PLA for provider enterprises is that it can prevent 
internal verticals from competing with each other on the basis 
of basic infrastructure. Rather, enterprise PLA allows internal 
verticals to eiciently diferentiate themselves at the applica-
tion level. The VP of PLA for consuming enterprises is that it al-
lows a single point of access to a multitude of capability provid-
ers—preventing lock-in to any particular provider. (Regardless 
of whether you like Mac or Window, iPhone or Android, you 
can have your choice of any number of competing application 
solution providers.) Signiicantly, in the traditional approach to 
defense acquisition, all the provider enterprise verticals—the 
individual programs—have no incentive or central governance 
structure to cause them to build on a common PLA. They do 
indeed compete with each other, in the Pentagon process, for 
the resources to build their own closed infrastructure. Mem-
bers of the defense consumer enterprise are locked in, either 
by regulation or tradition, to particular providers. Again, Ein-
stein might suggest that a fundamental change is in order. 
The N-ICE business model recognizes the need to make this 
fundamental change. Further, the N-ICE community recog-
nizes that information assurance (IA) and information interop-
erability (IoP), and the ironclad requirement to certify systems 
for both, are long poles for all defense acquisition activities. 
Any improvement to the current arcane, artisan, approach to 
IA and IoP certiication would be universally considered a lu-
crative VP. Accordingly, the N-ICE approach applies emerging 
virtualization and semantic technology to build IA and IoP into 
its PLA. The N-ICE community of practice includes experts at 
the NSA and experts at the Joint Interoperability Test Com-
mand (JITC), who are vested in the success of this approach. 
The George Mason University Command, Control, Communi-
cations, Computers, and Intelligence (GMU C4I) Center is also 
a member of the N-ICE community of practice. On one hand, 
the GMU C4I Center has embraced the general PLA VP to 
address the issues of life cycle maintenance (LCM) for military 
MOSA. On the other hand, the center (and its partners) are 
applying OSS, Agile development, and Internet collaborative 
technologies according to their version of the VOTS business 
model. This approach considers LCM to be an end-to-end 
process that:
•	 Includes operational customers as partners in a continuous 
requirement capture  development/discovery of capabil-
ity  T&E/V&V/certiication  deployment feedback loop
•	 Recognizes that requirements for IA and Interoperability 
provide high barriers to entry for industry at large, add cost, 
and slow acquisition. 
•	 Provides a virtual distributed, on line, low cost, non-propri-
etary Open Standard Test Framework (OSTF) that includes:
— Conigurable instance(s) of military PLA
— Open source software development kits (SDKs) for IA 
and IoP components.
•	 Agile, OSS collaborative engineering environment allows/
enforces continuously improving streamlined workflow 
across ecosystem of provider, consumers, and certiiers. 
The N-ICE initiative, through the GMU C4I contribution de-
scribed, aims to create an Einsteinian portal from the as-is, 
massive, serial, ponderous Defense IT acquisition process, to 
the to-be, lean, parallel, agile, process. In this case, “open” 
means open. Please join us.
The authors can be contacted at cgunders@nps.edu and mpullen@c4i.
gmu.edu.
In our view, the elephant in 
the room is that to leverage 
any of these at scale, the DE 
must be generally competent 
to field large IT systems. 
Clearly, that is not the case.
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